Pass the PRMIA PRM Certification 8008 Questions and answers with CertsForce

Choice 'a' (The amplification of smaller initial shocks to one risk factor creating larger subsequent shocks through system-wide interactions between other risks, creating self-perpetuating downward stresses in the markets) is the most comprehensive description of 'feedback effects', as described in the BCBS document on stress testing. Choice 'c' is one manifestation of feedback effects, but does not describe the entire effect. Choice 'b' is not a description of 'feedback effects', but one of the various weaknesses in stress testing that was seen during the crisis. Choice 'd' is plain nonsensical.

The BCBS paper provides a good and succinct description of feedback effect: how mortgage default shocks led to a deterioration of market prices of CDOs, followed by a drying up of the liquidity in these markets. This led to banks having to hold on to assets they intended to securitize (securitization and warehousing risk), and given the absence of transparency on who was exposed to what, banks refusing to lend to each other and a drying up of the wholesale funding market as well. All of this was additionally accompanied by a general flight to quality, households withdrawing money from money market funds creating a crisis in that market as well. At each stage, the initial shock was amplified and fed back into the system through interactions that had not been imagined by any market participant or regulator, leave alone risk managers.

In the February of 2009, the Federal Reserve (which is the US central bank system) and other US banking regulators embarked on a simultaneous assessment of the capital held by the 19 largest US bank holding companies. This was an unprecedented exercise of a kind never undertaken before, and was known as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). The purpose of the exercise was to determine the amount of additional capital (called the 'capital buffer') each of the institutions covered would need to ensure that it would have sufficient capital if the economy weakened more than was then expected. The idea was that these financial institutions would then raise additional capital equal to their respective capital buffers by the fourth quarter of 2009.

Statement I is false on two counts: firstl the SCAP was conducted by the US central bank and other regulators, and not the 'Treasury Department' (the Treasury Department in the US is the equivalent of the Ministry of Finance in may other countries). Second, the SCAP was a one time exercise, and not annual.

Statement II is correct. The regulators prescribed rates of losses on credit assets of different kinds and other macro-economic assumptions, and asked the banks to determine the extent of losses they would need to bear (in addition to calculating them independently too). Therefore the SCAP was a stress test where the scenario was prescribed by the regulators.

Statement III is false. Capital buffer under the SCAP referred to the additional capital the banks would need to have certain ratios of capital, and not 'excess' capital.

Statement IV is correct. The SCAP envisaged two capital targets: a Tier 1 capital ratio in excess of 6% at the end of 2010; and a Tier 1 common capital ratio in excess of 4%. Therefore both the total Tier 1 capital and Tier 1 common capital were targeted.

Therefore Choice 'c' is the correct answer.

The square root of time rule can be used to convert, say a 1-day VaR to a 10-day VaR, by multiplying the known number by the square root of time to get the VaR over a different time horizon. However, there are key assumptions that underlie the application of this rule, and statements I to IV correctly state those assumptions.

Statements V and VI are not correct, because the application of the square root of time rule requires the absence of serial correlations, and also the absence of volatility clustering (ie independence). Therefore Choice 'c' is the correct answer.

The square root of time rule is also applied to convert volatility or standard deviation for one period to the volatility for a different time period. Remember that VaR is just a multiple of volatility, and therefore the assumptions that apply to the square root of time rule for VaR also apply to the same rule when used in the context of volatilities or standard deviation.

Units of Measure for operational risk are homogenous groupings of risks to allow sensible modeling decisions to be made. For example, some risks may be fat-tailed, for example the risk of regulatory fines. Other risks may have finite tails - for example damage to physical assets risk (DPA) may be limited to the value of the asset in the question.

Additionally, risk reporting may need to be done at the line of business, legal entity or regional basis, and in order to be able to do, so the right level of granularity needs to be captured in the risk modeling exercise. The level of granularity applied is called the 'unit of measurement' (UoM), and it is okay to adopt all of the choices listed above as the dimensions that describe the unit of measure.

Note that it is entirely possible, even likely, to use legal entity, risk type, region, business and other dimensions simultaneously, though doing so is likely to result in an extremely large number of UoM combinations. That can be addressed by then subsequently grouping the more granular UoMs into larger UoMs, which may ultimately be used for frequency and severity estimation.

All four data sources are expected to be utilized as inputs as appropriate for operational risk calculations under the advanced measurement approach. Of these, the last one, BEICF, is slightly different from the rest as it does not yield data points that become the basis of curve fitting or other statistical computions underlying capital calculations. It includes items such as KRIs, risk assessments etc and allow the risk manager to assess the qualitative aspects of loss data.

A break close, also called a 'mutual put', gives either party the right to terminate a transaction at market price at a given date, or dates in the future. These are usually availed of in longer dated transactions, eg 10 years and over. For example, a 15-year swap might have a mutual put in year 5, and every 2 years thereafter.

All other choices are incorrect.

The credit spread is equal to the default rate times the loss given default, or stated another way, default rate times (1 - recovery rate). It is not equal to the default rate times the recovery rate. Therefore statement I is not correct.

When ratings are upgraded by rating agencies, the spread contracts and not widen. Therefore statement II is not correct.

Both recovery rates and probabilities of default are related to the business cycle, and they move in opposite directions. Economic recessions witness an increase in the default rate and a decrease in the recovery rate, and economic expansions result in a decrease in the default rate and an increase in the recovery rates when default does happen. Therefore statement III is correct.

Bond spreads incorporate both the risk of default, but also considerations of liquidity in the case of corporate bonds. Hence statement IV is correct.

The probability of default would make the expected value of the future cash flows from both the corporate bond and the risk free bond identical. If p be the probability of default, the cash flows from the risky corporate bond would be

= (cash flows in the event of default x probability of default) + (cash flows without default x (1 - probability of default))

=> 5%*0 + (1 - 5%)*(1 + 12%) = (1 + Rf).

therefore Rf = 6.4%

(In reality investors would demand a 'credit risk premium' over and above the expected default loss rate. They are unlikely to be happy with just being compensated with exactly the expected default loss rate plus the risk-fre rate because the expected default loss rate itself is uncertain. They would demand some premium over and above what the default rate alone might mathematically imply above the risk free rate. In this question, this credit risk premium is ignored.)

The trend component refers to parallel shifts in the term structure, the tilt refers to changes in the shape of the term structure at the long and short ends, and the curvature refers to movements in the medium term part. The phrase 'parallel component' has no meaning and is not a part of the principal components in analyzing term structures.

Changes in the term structure can also be analyzed as "level, slope and curvature", so you should be aware of this terminology as well to refer to the principal components of a term structure analysis.

The cumulative probability of default for the security for the 5 years is [1 - (1 - probability of default upto year 4)*(1 - probability of default in year 5)]. An easier way to think about this is that the Probability of survival till year 5 = (Probability of survival till year 4 * Probability of survival during year 5). Using the relationship that probability of default = 1 - probability of survival, we can calculate the required probability in all cases.

In this case, the cumulative probability of default for the security for 5 years = 1 - (1 - 11.47%)*(1 - 5%) = 15.8695%, therefore Choice 'c' is the correct answer.