Pass the HP Aruba-ACNSA HPE6-A78 Questions and answers with CertsForce

A honeypot can be used to launch a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack on wireless clients by examining wireless clients' probe requests and then broadcasting the SSIDs in those probes. Clients with those SSIDs in their preferred network list may then automatically connect to the honeypot, believing it to be a legitimate network. Once the client is connected to the attacker's honeypot, the attacker can intercept, monitor, or manipulate the client's traffic, effectively executing a MITM attack.

To ensure that only management stations in the subnet 192.168.1.0/24 can access the ArubaOS-Switches' Command Line Interface (CLI), Web UI, and REST interfaces, while also allowing managers to access other parts of the network, you should specify 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 as the authorized manager IP address on the switches. This configuration will restrict access to the switch management interfaces to devices within the specified IP address range, effectively creating a management access list.

For WPA3-Enterprise with EAP-TLS, it's crucial that clients have a trusted certificate installed for the authentication process. EAP-TLS relies on a mutual exchange of certificates for authentication. Deploying client certificates signed by a CA that CPPM trusts ensures that the ClearPass Policy Manager can verify the authenticity of the client certificates during the TLS handshake process. Trust in the root CA is typically required for the server side of the authentication process, not the client side, which is covered by the client’s own certificate.

The correct approach for capturing packets from a wireless client in a WLAN that uses Tunnel forwarding mode and WPA3-Enterprise, managed by an Aruba Mobility Controller and Campus APs, is to use an Air Monitor (AM). An AM is specifically designed to capture wireless traffic "in the air," which means it listens to the wireless signals transmitted between devices and the access points. This method ensures that the capture includes all the necessary details while maintaining the integrity and security of the data as it is transmitted over the air. Using an Air Monitor helps in analyzing the raw wireless traffic before it gets encrypted or tunneled to the Mobility Controller, providing a clear view of the wireless client's activity and interactions. The information regarding the use of Air Monitors for packet capture in such environments can be found in the Aruba Network's official documentation and configuration guides for WLAN setups and security analysis.

When configuring an ArubaOS-CX switch to send RADIUS debug messages to a central SIEM server, it is important to correctly direct these debug outputs. The command debug radius all activates debugging for all RADIUS processes, capturing detailed logs about RADIUS operations. If the SIEM server is already defined on the switch for logging purposes (as indicated by the command logging 10.5.6.12), the correct destination for these debug messages to be sent to the SIEM server would be through the syslog. This ensures that all generated logs are forwarded to the centralized server specified for logging, enabling consistent log management and analysis. Using syslog as the destination leverages the existing logging setup and integrates seamlessly with the network's centralized monitoring systems.

In ArubaOS-CX, managing and searching logs can be crucial for tracking and diagnosing issues related to network operations such as port authentication. To efficiently find logs related to port authentication, configuring a logging filter specifically for this category is highly effective.

Logging Filter Configuration: In ArubaOS-CX, you can configure logging filters to refine the logs that are collected and viewed. By setting up a filter for the "port-access" category, you focus the logging system to only capture and display entries related to port authentication events. This approach reduces the volume of log data to sift through, making it easier to identify relevant issues.

Global Application of Filter: Applying the filter globally ensures that all relevant log messages, regardless of their origin within the switch's modules or interfaces, are captured under the specified category. This global application is crucial for comprehensive monitoring across the entire device.

Alternative Options and Their Evaluation:

Option A: Adding "-C and *-c port-access" to the "show logging" command is not a standard command format in ArubaOS-CX for filtering logs directly through the show command.

Option C: Enabling debugging for "portaccess" indeed increases the detail of logs but primarily serves to provide real-time diagnostic information rather than filtering existing logs.

Option D: Specifying a logging facility focuses on routing logs to different destinations or subsystems and does not inherently filter by log category like port-access.

Setting up a packet capture on an Aruba Mobility Controller (MC) is particularly useful in scenarios where detailed analysis of network traffic is necessary to identify and address security concerns. Option B is the correct answer because it directly addresses the need to closely examine the traffic of a potentially malicious wireless endpoint. Packet capture on the MC allows the security team to collect and analyze traffic to/from specific endpoints in real-time, providing valuable insights into the nature of the traffic and potentially identifying harmful activities. This capability is essential for forensics and troubleshooting security incidents, enabling administrators to respond effectively to threats.

The recommended approach for preventing users in the "user_group1" role from using gaming and peer-to-peer applications in an ArubaOS environment is to enable Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and add application rules that specifically deny access to these types of applications for the role. DPI allows the network system to analyze the content of network traffic in real time and apply policies based on what it detects, including blocking specific applications like gaming and peer-to-peer sharing. This capability is essential for effectively managing application usage on the network and ensuring compliance with organizational policies. Application-specific rules provide precise control over the network traffic by identifying the application regardless of the network port used, making it a more effective method than blocking based on ports or IP addresses.

Endpoint classification in HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) involves identifying and categorizing devices on the network to enforce access policies. CPPM supports two types of profiling methods: passive and active.

Passive Profiling: Involves observing network traffic that devices send as part of their normal operation, without CPPM sending any requests to the device. Examples include DHCP fingerprinting, HTTP User-Agent analysis, and TCP fingerprinting.

Active Profiling: Involves CPPM sending requests to the device to gather information, such as SNMP scans, WMI scans, or SSH probes.

Option A, "TCP fingerprinting," is correct. TCP fingerprinting is a passive profiling method where CPPM analyzes TCP packet headers (e.g., TTL, window size) in the device’s normal network traffic to identify its operating system. This does not require CPPM to send any requests to the device, making it a passive method.

Option B, "SSH scans," is incorrect. SSH scans involve actively connecting to a device over SSH to gather information (e.g., system details), which is an active profiling method.

Option C, "WMI scans," is incorrect. Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) scans involve CPPM querying a Windows device to gather information (e.g., OS version, installed software), which is an active profiling method.

Option D, "SNMP scans," is incorrect. SNMP scans involve CPPM sending SNMP requests to a device to gather information (e.g., system description, interfaces), which is an active profiling method.

The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:

"Passive profiling methods observe network traffic that endpoints send as part of their normal operation, without ClearPass sending any requests to the device. An example of passive profiling is TCP fingerprinting, where ClearPass analyzes TCP packet headers (e.g., TTL, window size) to identify the device’s operating system. Active profiling methods, such as SNMP scans, WMI scans, or SSH scans, involve ClearPass sending requests to the device to gather information." (Page 246, Passive vs. Active Profiling Section)

Additionally, the ClearPass Device Insight Data Sheet notes:

"Passive profiling techniques, such as TCP fingerprinting, allow ClearPass to identify devices without generating additional network traffic. By analyzing TCP attributes in the device’s normal traffic, ClearPass can fingerprint the OS, making it a non-intrusive method for endpoint classification." (Page 3, Profiling Methods Section)

When a client (e.g., a Chrome browser) accesses an HTTPS server, the server presents a certificate to establish a secure connection. The client must validate the certificate to trust the server. The certificate in this scenario has the following properties:

Subject name: myhost.example.com

SAN (Subject Alternative Name): DNS: myhost.example.com; DNS: myhost1.example.com

Extended Key Usage (EKU): Server authentication

Issuer: MyCA_Signing (an intermediate CA)

The server also sends an intermediate CA certificate for MyCA_Signing, signed by MyCA (the root CA).

The client’s Trusted CA Certificate list does not include MyCA or MyCA_Signing.

Certificate Validation Process:

Name Validation: The client checks if the server’s hostname (myhost1.example.com) matches the Subject name or a SAN in the certificate. Here, the SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," so the name validation passes.

EKU Validation: The client verifies that the certificate’s EKU includes "Server authentication," which is required for HTTPS. The EKU is correctly set to "Server authentication," so this validation passes.

Chain of Trust Validation: The client builds a certificate chain from the server’s certificate to a trusted root CA in its Trusted CA Certificate list. The chain is:

Server certificate (issued by MyCA_Signing)

Intermediate CA certificate (MyCA_Signing, issued by MyCA)

Root CA certificate (MyCA, which should be in the client’s trust store) The client’s Trusted CA Certificate list does not include MyCA or MyCA_Signing, meaning the client cannot build a chain to a trusted root CA. This causes the validation to fail.

Option A, "The client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is correct. The client’s trust store must include the root CA (MyCA) to trust the certificate chain. Since MyCA is not in the client’s Trusted CA Certificate list, the client cannot validate the chain, and the certificate is not trusted.

Option B, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN," is incorrect. The SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," which matches the server’s hostname, so the SAN is valid.

Option C, "The certificate lacks the correct EKU," is incorrect. The EKU is set to "Server authentication," which is appropriate for HTTPS.

Option D, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN, and the client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is incorrect because the SAN is valid, as explained above. The only issue is the missing trusted CA certificates.

The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:

"For a client to trust a server’s certificate during HTTPS communication, the client must validate the certificate chain to a trusted root CA in its trust store. If the root CA (e.g., MyCA) or intermediate CA (e.g., MyCA_Signing) is not in the client’s Trusted CA Certificate list, the chain of trust cannot be established, and the client will reject the certificate. The Subject Alternative Name (SAN) must include the server’s hostname, and the Extended Key Usage (EKU) must include ‘Server authentication’ for HTTPS." (Page 205, Certificate Validation Section)

Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Fundamentals Guide notes:

"A common reason for certificate validation failure is the absence of the root CA certificate in the client’s trust store. For example, if a server’s certificate is issued by an intermediate CA (e.g., MyCA_Signing) that chains to a root CA (e.g., MyCA), the client must have the root CA certificate in its Trusted CA Certificate list to trust the chain." (Page 45, Certificate Trust Issues Section)