The highest-signal next step is to scope and confirm the suspicious execution pattern by identifying related process creation events. Event ID 4688 records process creation in Windows Security logs when auditing is enabled, and it can capture command-line details that confirm the use of -ExecutionPolicy Bypass and -NoProfile, as well as parent/child relationships. Since the activity is on a domain controller and the parent is winrm.exe (remote management), the SOC must quickly determine whether this is isolated or part of a broader remote execution campaign. Searching for similar 4688 events over a relevant window (such as the last 24 hours) helps identify frequency, affected accounts, and whether the same command line or script path appears across hosts. Event ID 4625 (failed logon) can provide context for brute force attempts, but it does not directly validate or scope the suspicious PowerShell executions already observed. Event ID 7045 (new service installation) is important if there are signs of service-based persistence, but it is a different hypothesis. Event ID 5145 is about network share access and can be useful for lateral movement, but the immediate priority is to scope execution behavior. Therefore, focusing on 4688 process creation for similar PowerShell executions is the best primary step.