Pass the Linux Foundation Kubernetes and Cloud Native CNPA Questions and answers with CertsForce

The defining capability of an IDP is enabling self-service so developers can independently access infrastructure and platform resources. Option D is correct because self-service resource provisioning APIs allow developers to provision resources such as namespaces, databases, or environments without relying on manual intervention from the platform team. These APIs embed governance, compliance, and organizational guardrails while giving autonomy to development teams.

Option A (manual deployment services) defeats the purpose of self-service. Option B (knowledge centers) improve documentation but do not provide automation. Option C (logging/monitoring interfaces) are observability tools, not resource provisioning mechanisms.

Self-service APIs empower developers, reduce cognitive load, and minimize bottlenecks. They also align with the platform engineering principle of “treating the platform as a product,” where developers are customers, and the platform offers curated golden paths to simplify consumption of infrastructure and services.

In most container registries, the latest tag is simply an alias pointing to whichever image was most recently built and pushed, unless explicitly overridden. Option A is correct because the latest tag does not carry any semantic guarantee beyond being the most recently tagged version.

Option B is incorrect—latest does not imply security validation or attestation. Option C is false because production systems should not rely on latest; instead, immutable, versioned tags or digests should be used for reproducibility. Option D is misleading, as latest is not tied to Git history but rather to tag assignment during the build/push process.

While convenient for testing or local development, relying on latest in production pipelines is discouraged. Platform engineering best practices emphasize explicit versioning and image immutability to ensure consistency, reproducibility, and traceability. Using signed images with SBOM attestation is recommended for security and compliance, while latest should only be used in controlled, non-production workflows.

An incident management system’s primary function is to coordinate response during outages, ensuring that alerts are centralized, on-call personnel are notified, communication is managed, and visibility is maintained. Option B is correct because it emphasizes the core responsibilities of incident management systems like PagerDuty, Opsgenie, or ServiceNow. These systems streamline response efforts, reducing mean time to recovery (MTTR).

Option A (incident documentation) is valuable but usually a secondary outcome of incident management. Option C (root cause analysis) is part of post-incident reviews, not the primary function during active response. Option D (automated remediation) may be supported by runbooks but is not the core role of incident management systems.

By centralizing and standardizing incident response, these systems enhance collaboration, reduce confusion, and provide stakeholders with up-to-date information on incident status, which is critical for maintaining trust and operational resilience.

Mutual TLS (mTLS) is the core mechanism for securing service-to-service communication in cloud native environments. Option B is correct because mTLS provides encryption in transit and mutual authentication, ensuring both the client and server verify each other’s identity. This prevents unauthorized access, man-in-the-middle attacks, and data leakage.

Option A (API Gateway) manages ingress traffic from external clients but does not secure internal service-to-service communication. Option C (Service Mesh) is a broader infrastructure layer (e.g., Istio, Linkerd) that implements mTLS, but mTLS itself is the mechanism that enforces secure communications. Option D (Load Balancer) distributes traffic but does not handle encryption or authentication.

mTLS is foundational to zero-trust networking inside Kubernetes clusters. Service meshes typically provide automated certificate management and policy enforcement, ensuring seamless adoption of mTLS without requiring developers to modify application code.

Modern platform engineering requires security and compliance to be integral parts of the delivery process, not afterthoughts. CI/CD pipelines are the foundation for delivering platform software rapidly and reliably, and integrating SBOM generation and automated vulnerability scanning directly within pipelines ensures that risks are identified early in the lifecycle.

Option B is correct because it reflects recommended practices from cloud native platform engineering standards: SBOMs provide a transparent inventory of all software components, including dependencies, which is crucial for vulnerability management, license compliance, and supply chain security. By automating these steps in CI/CD, teams can maintain both velocity and security without manual overhead.

Option A downplays the relevance of SBOMs for platform software, which is inaccurate because platform components (like Kubernetes operators, ingress controllers, or logging agents) are equally susceptible to vulnerabilities. Option C dismisses automation in favor of periodic audits, which contradicts the shift-left security principle. Option D misunderstands CI/CD’s purpose: security must be integrated, not separated.