Pass the ACAMS AML Certifications CAMS Questions and answers with CertsForce

these are the enhanced customer due diligence measures that the 5th EU Money Laundering Directive requires for high-risk third country nationals. According to the directive, entities must obtain the approval of senior management for establishing or continuing the business relationship, obtain information on the reasons for intended or performed transactions, and obtain information on the source of funds and source of wealth of the customer and of the beneficial owner(s). These measures are intended to increase the transparency and scrutiny of the customers and their transactions, and to prevent the misuse of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes.

ACAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, Chapter 2, Section 2.3, page 56: “The EU’s Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive”.

ExamTopics, Question 456: “According to the 5th EU Money Laundering Directive, member states require entities to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures with respect to business relationships or transactions involving high-risk third country nationals. Which are included in these requirements? (Choose three.)”

The decision of whether or not to file a suspicious transaction report (also known as a suspicious activity report or SAR in the United States) often involves weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors arising from the research conducted during the investigative process. The final decision should be documented and supported by the reasoning that was used to make the determination. The transaction has already been investigated which led to the requesting of the document. The document checked out and the question did not specify the document was suspicious, therefore we can conclude an STR does not need to be completed and thus should move to document the reason why an STR wasn't completed.

Money laundering negatively affects economic stability by discouraging investment, distorting markets, and eroding public trust.

Option A (Correct):A financial system tainted by money laundering loses credibility, leading to reduced investor and consumer confidence.

Option D (Correct):Foreign investors avoid jurisdictions with weak AML controls due to the risk of sanctions and reputational damage.

Option B (Incorrect):While tax evasion is linked to money laundering, it does not directly affect the decision to implement tax incentives.

Option C (Incorrect):Unemployment may result from economic instability, but money laundering does not directly cause job losses.

Option E (Incorrect):Money laundering often increases volatility in financial markets, not reduces it.

This is the correct answer because the institution must ensure that the beneficiaries of the transfers are not on a terrorist watch list, such as the United Nations Security Council Consolidated List, the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, or the European Union Terrorism List. These lists contain the names of individuals, entities, and groups that are subject to sanctions or other measures due to their involvement or association with terrorism or terrorist financing. The institution must screen the beneficiaries of the transfers against these lists and report any matches or hits to the relevant authorities. Failing to do so may expose the institution to legal, regulatory, or reputational risks, as well as facilitate the financing of terrorism.

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, Module 3: International AML/CTF Standards, Lesson 3.2: International AML/CTF Standards

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition2, Chapter 3: International AML/CTF Standards, Section 3.2: International AML/CTF Standards, pp. 57-58

ACAMS CAMS Examination Preparation Seminar, 6th Edition3, Chapter 3: International AML/CTF Standards, Section 3.2: International AML/CTF Standards, Slide 12

Fraud and financial crime are often associated withsudden resignations, attempts to evade scrutiny, and financial behaviors inconsistent with legitimate income.

Option A (Correct):Being evasive about past employment suggests potential undisclosed misconduct.

Option D (Correct):Living beyond one’s means is a major financial crime red flag, indicating possible fraud or illicit earnings.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option B (Incorrect):Nationality alone does not indicate fraud risk.

Option C (Incorrect):Having friends in high-risk industries is not necessarily a direct red flag.

Common Red Flags for Employee-Related Financial Crime:

Reluctance to take vacations or change roles (attempting to conceal wrongdoing).

Sudden resignation or disappearance following internal investigations.

Unusual financial activity, including large unexplained deposits.

Best Practices for Fraud Prevention in Corporations:

Regularly monitor employees in high-risk roles (e.g., finance, procurement).

Use whistleblower channels to detect internal misconduct.

Conduct thorough background checks before hiring employees.

According to the ACAMS CAMS Study Guide (the 6th edition), one of the key steps in conducting an effective investigation of a potential money laundering or terrorist financing activity is to gather all relevant information about the customer and the transaction, including the nature and purpose of the account, the source and destination of funds,the expected account activity, and the customer’s risk profile1. In this case, the compliance officer should meet with the staff who opened the new account for the public official to obtain this information and assess whether the account is consistent with the customer’s profile and needs, or whether it indicates a possible attempt to conceal or launder illicit funds. Waiting for the new account to receive funds, calling the competentauthorities, or calling the official’s office are not appropriate actions at this stage, as they may compromise the investigation, alert the customer, or violate confidentiality rules1.

ACAMS CAMS Study Guide (the 6th edition), Chapter 4: Conducting or Supporting the Investigation Process, page 1311

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, the institution should develop a system to monitor all the activity of the customer’s accounts to mitigate the risk associated with these accounts. This is because the customer’s behavior and profile may indicate some red flags of money laundering, such as:

Operating an import-export business, which is a common sector for trade-based money laundering, where trade transactions are used to disguise the movement of illicit funds, either by over- or under-invoicing, misrepresenting the quantity or quality of goods, or falsifying documents1.

Receiving funds from a jurisdiction perceived as highly corrupt, which may increase the risk of the funds being derived from bribery, embezzlement, fraud, or other predicate offences2. Transparency International is a global civil society organization that publishes an annual CorruptionPerceptions Index, which ranks countries by their perceived levels of public sector corruption based on expert assessments and surveys3.

Making frequent transfers among the accounts, which may indicate a layering technique, where funds are moved through multiple accounts, institutions, or jurisdictions to obscure the audit trail and the source and ownership of the funds4.

Preferring to manage the accounts separately, which may indicate a lack of transparency or an attempt to avoid detection or reporting by the institution.

By developing a system to monitor all the activity of the customer’s accounts, the institution can:

Identify and verify the identity and beneficial ownership of the customer and the parties involved in the transactions.

Obtain and verify information on the nature and purpose of the business relationship and the source and destination of the funds.

Conduct a risk assessment of the customer and the transactions based on the customer’s profile, behavior, and geographic locations.

Apply enhanced due diligence and ongoing monitoring measures for higher-risk customers and transactions, such as obtaining additional information, documentation, or approval, or conducting more frequent or in-depth reviews.

Detect and report any suspicious or unusual transactions or activities to the relevant authorities.

The other three options are incorrect because:

File a suspicious transaction report is not the best answer, as it is a reactive measure that should be taken after the institution has identified or suspected money laundering or terrorist financing activity, not before. The institution should first conduct due diligence and monitoring of the customer and the transactions, and then file a report if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the activity is suspicious or unusual.

Diminish the importance of the subjective Transparency International rating is not the best answer, as it is a complacent and irresponsible attitude that may expose the institution to legal, regulatory, reputational, or operational risks. The Transparency International rating is not subjective, but based on credible sources and methodologies, and it is widely used as a reference by governments, businesses, civil society, and the public to assess the level of corruption in different countries3. The institution should not ignore or downplay the rating, but rather use it as one of the factors to evaluate the risk of the customer and the transactions.

Conduct a trade-price manipulation analysis is not the best answer, as it is a specific and technical measure that may not be sufficient or appropriate to mitigate the risk associated with these accounts. A trade-price manipulation analysis is a method of detecting trade-based money laundering by comparing the prices of goods or services in a transaction with the market prices or other benchmarks, and identifying any significant discrepancies or anomalies. However, this measure may not be feasible or effective if the institution does not have access to reliable and comparable data, or if the goods or services are not standardized or homogeneous. Moreover, this measure may not address other aspects of the risk, such as the identity, ownership, or behavior of the customer and the parties involved in the transactions.

1: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 108 2: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 107 3: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 3 4: ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 106 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 103 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 103 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 104 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 105 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 105 : ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, Chapter 5, p. 109

The FATF conducts mutual evaluations—a peer review process—whereby member countries assess each other’s AML/CFT systems. This includes on-site visits and reviews by international experts, with public reports containing recommendations for improvement. The process is not punitive and does not impose sanctions.

“FATF mutual evaluations are peer reviews in which experts from member countries assess another member's AML/CFT system and provide recommendations.”

(CAMS 6th Edition, International AML/CFT Standards; FATF Methodology, Recommendation 40)

According to the CAMS study guide, chapter 1, page 91, placement is the first stage of money laundering, where the illicit funds are introduced into the financial system. Thisstage involves the highest risk of detection, as the money launderers may use various methods to avoid suspicion, such as structuring, commingling, or using cash-intensive businesses. Placement is followed by layering and integration, which are the second and third stages of money laundering, where the illicit funds are moved and disguised through multiple transactions and entities, and then integrated into the legitimate economy as seemingly legal assets.

The other options are not the financial stages of money laundering, although they may be related to some aspects or techniques of money laundering. Option A, integration, is the final stage of money laundering, not the first. Option B, structuring, is a method of placement, not a stage of money laundering. Structuring, also known as smurfing, is the practice of breaking down large amounts of cash into smaller deposits or transactions to avoid reporting thresholds or scrutiny. Option C, off shoring, is a term that refers to the relocation of assets or activities to another jurisdiction, usually for tax or regulatory advantages. Off shoring may be used by money launderers to exploit the differences or loopholes between jurisdictions, but it is not a stage of money laundering.

1: ACAMS CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 1, page 9: https://www.acams.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/ACAMS-CAMS-Study-Guide-6th-Edition-Chapter-1.pdf

According to the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent Banking, the risk of a correspondent bank customer depends on various factors, such as the nature of the customer’s business, the customer’s location, the products and services offered, the customer’s ownership and management structure, and the customer’s customer base1. Among these factors, two that should increase the risk and require additional due diligence are:

The customer is located in a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member country and the bank’s head of information security is a politically exposed person (PEP). A PEP is an individual who is or has been entrusted with a prominent public function, such as a senior government official, a judicial or military officer, a senior executive of a state-owned corporation, or a political party leader2. PEPs pose a higher risk of money laundering, corruption, or bribery due to their influence and access to public funds3. Therefore, a correspondent bank customer that has a PEP in a key position should be subject to enhanced due diligence, such as verifying the source of funds, the purpose of the relationship, and the PEP’s reputation and integrity4.

The customer is located in a non-FATF member country and services mostly commercial customers who engage in international trade. A non-FATF member country is a country that is not part of the FATF, an inter-governmental body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system5. Non-FATF member countries may have weaker or less consistent anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes, and may pose a higher risk of financial crime or sanctions evasion6. Moreover, a correspondent bank customer that services mostly commercial customers who engage in international trade may be exposed to trade-based money laundering, which is the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions7. Therefore, a correspondent bank customer that operates in a non-FATF member country and deals with international trade should be subject to enhanced due diligence, such as obtaining information on the nature and volume of the trade transactions, the origin and destination of the goods, and the identity and reputation of the trade counterparties8.

The other options are not correct because they do not necessarily increase the risk of a correspondent bank customer or require additional due diligence. A customer that is located in a FATF member country and provides services primarily to a local individual customer may pose a lower risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, as the customer’s activities are subject to the FATF standards and recommendations, and the customer’s customer base is less likely to involve complex or cross-border transactions. A customer that is located in a FATF member country and provides services to other correspondent banks in neighboring countries may also pose a lower risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, as the customer’s activities are subject to the FATF standards and recommendations, and the customer’s customer base is composed of regulated financial institutions that are subject to their own anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing obligations.

nswer:BD

According to the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent Banking, the risk of a correspondent bank customer depends on various factors, such as the nature of the customer’s business, the customer’s location, the products and services offered, the customer’s ownership and management structure, and the customer’s customer base1. Among these factors, two that should increase the risk and require additional due diligence are:

The customer is located in a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member country and the bank’s head of information security is a politically exposed person (PEP). A PEP is an individual who is or has been entrusted with a prominent public function, such as a senior government official, a judicial or military officer, a senior executive of a state-owned corporation, or a political party leader2. PEPs pose a higher risk of money laundering, corruption, or bribery due to their influence and access to public funds3. Therefore, a correspondent bank customer that has a PEP in a key position should be subject to enhanced due diligence, such as verifying the source of funds, the purpose of the relationship, and the PEP’s reputation and integrity4.

The customer is located in a non-FATF member country and services mostly commercial customers who engage in international trade. A non-FATF member country is a country that is not part of the FATF, an inter-governmental body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system5. Non-FATF member countries may have weaker or less consistent anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes, and may pose a higher risk of financial crime or sanctions evasion6. Moreover, a correspondent bank customer that services mostly commercial customers who engage in international trade may be exposed to trade-based money laundering, which is the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions7. Therefore, a correspondent bank customer that operates in a non-FATF member country and deals with international trade should be subject to enhanced due diligence, such as obtaining information on the nature and volume of the trade transactions, the origin and destination of the goods, and the identity and reputation of the trade counterparties8.

This customer action indicates possible money laundering because it could be a sign of layering, which is the second stage of the money laundering process. Layering involves moving the illicit funds around to create distance and confusion between the source and the destination of the money. Transferring all funds to another bank on the same day of large cash deposits could be an attempt to avoid detection by the bank’s transaction monitoring system or by the authorities. It could also be a way to break the audit trail and obscure the origin of the funds.

The other customer actions are not necessarily indicative of money laundering, although they could raise some red flags depending on the context and the customer profile. Continually making weekly small cash deposits could be a sign of structuring, which is a technique to avoid reporting requirements by depositing amounts below the threshold. However, this could also be a legitimate behavior for a tutor who receives cash payments from students. Periodically initiating wire transfers to another account owned by a relative could be a sign of funneling, which is a technique to move funds between accounts that are not related to the business or personal activities of the customer. However, this could also be a legitimate behavior for a tutor who supports their family members financially. Opening a savings account and making frequent transfers from the checking account could be a sign of commingling, which is a technique to mix illicit funds with legitimate funds from a legal source. However, this could also be a legitimate behavior for a tutor who wants to save money for future expenses.

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS, Chapter 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, pp. 35-40

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS, CAMS Study Guide, pp. 28-32

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs, Module 2: Money Laundering Risks and Methods, Video 2.2: The Three Stages of Money Laundering

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Question 311, Answer C

A. Offering internal policies training: This is crucial. Employees need to understand the specific procedures and policies related to customer identification and verification. These internal policies ensure consistency and compliance.

B. Offering general background and history training: While historical context is valuable, it’s not the primary focus. AML training should prioritize practical knowledge and current best practices.

C. Offering periodic refresher training: Absolutely! Regular refresher training keeps employees up-to-date with evolving AML regulations and reinforces their understanding.

D. Offering tailored training for specific roles: This is essential. Different roles require different expertise. For example, investigators need to recognize red flags, while report writers must understand how to create effective suspicious activity reports.

Comprehensive Detailed Explanation:

Internal Policies Training: AML training should cover internal policies thoroughly. This includes customer identification and verification procedures, as well as other relevant policies specific to the organization. Employees need to understand how these policies translate into day-to-day practices.

General Background and History: While historical context can be interesting, it’s not the primary focus of AML training. Instead, the emphasis should be on practical knowledge, current best practices, and real-world scenarios.

Periodic Refresher Training: Regular refresher training is essential. AML regulations evolve, and employees need to stay informed. Annual or periodic refreshers reinforce knowledge and ensure compliance.

Tailored Training for Specific Roles: Different roles within an organization have distinct responsibilities related to AML. Tailored training ensures that employees understand their specific duties. For example, investigators need to recognize suspicious patterns, while report writers must know how to create effective reports.

On-line banking offers a significant money laundering risk to a financial institution because:

The nature of on-line banking can make it difficult to establish who is controlling the account. On-line banking allows customers to access their accounts remotely, without face-to-face contact with the financial institution. This can pose challenges for verifying the identity and legitimacy of the account holder, especially if the account is opened on-line or through a third-party intermediary. On-line banking can also facilitate the use of anonymous or fictitious identities, or the use of proxies or nominees to hide the true beneficial owner of the account.

The ease of access through the internet enables cross border movement of funds. On-line banking allows customers to transfer funds quickly and easily across different jurisdictions, without physical movement of cash or other instruments. This can increase the risk of money laundering, as funds can be moved to or from high-risk countries or regions, or through multiple accounts or financial institutions, to obscure the origin, destination, or purpose of the funds. On-line banking can also enable customers to access or use alternative payment systems or virtual currencies, which may have lower regulatory oversight or transparency standards than traditional banking systems.

The speed of electronic transaction enables execution of multiple complex transactions within short time frame. On-line banking allows customers to conduct transactions in real time, with minimal or no human intervention or verification. This can increase the risk of money laundering, as customers can execute multiple transactions in a short period of time, or use complex transaction structures or patterns, to avoid detection or reporting thresholds, or to conceal the source, nature, or ownership of the funds. On-line banking can also enable customers to use automated or algorithmic trading systems, which may generate large volumes of transactions that are difficult to monitor or analyze.

CAMS Study Guide - 6th Edition, Chapter 5, pages 139-140

CAMS Certification Exam Outline, Domain 2, Task 2.1, Skill 2.1.1

Online Banking and Money Laundering, ACAMS Today, September 2012

According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the red flags for money laundering in crowdfunding platforms is “projects that are fully funded within a very short period of time, especially if the funding comes from a small number of donors or from a single donor” (p. 222). This could indicate that the project is a front for laundering illicit funds or financing terrorism. The other options are not necessarily indicative of money laundering risk, as they could be explained by legitimate factors such as the popularity, urgency, or ambition of the project.

ACAMS. (2020). Study Guide for the Certification Examination for Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (6th ed.). Miami, FL: ACAMS.

ESMA. (2015)Questions and Answers: Investment-based crowdfunding and money laundering/terrorist financing 1. Paris, France: ESMA.

According to the FATF Recommendations, the competent authority that should directly receive suspicious or unusual transaction reports is the financial intelligence unit (FIU). The FIU is a central, national agency responsible for receiving, analyzing and disseminating information related to money laundering and terrorist financing. The FIU should have operational independence and autonomy, and should be able to exchange information with other domestic and foreign authorities. The FIU should also provide feedback to the reporting entities on the use and value of their reports.

=

CAMS Certification Package - 6th Edition | ACAMS1

CAMS Certifications: How to Get CAMS Certified | ACAMS2

ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs3

Exam CAMS: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition)4

FATF Recommendations, Recommendation 29: Financial Intelligence Units

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf

The line of business is responsible for creating, implementing and maintaining policies and procedures, as well as communicating these to all personnel. It must also establish processes for screening employees to ensure high ethical and professional standards and deliver appropriate training on AML policies and procedures based on roles and functions performed so employees aware of their responsibilities. To facilitate this, employees should be trained as soon as possible after being hired, with refresher training as appropriate.

The correct answer is B, C, and E, as these three present the highest anti-money laundering or sanctions risk and will require controls prior to launch. According to the FATF Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers1, P2P transactions pose significant challenges for AML/CFT compliance, as they may involve anonymous or pseudonymous parties, cross-border transfers, real-time settlement, and limited information on the beneficiaries. These factors increase the risk of money laundering, terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion, as well as the difficulty of detecting and reporting suspicious activity. Therefore, the institution should implement appropriate controls to mitigate these risks, such as:

Conducting enhanced due diligence on customers who use the P2P service, especially if they are located in high-risk jurisdictions or are involved in high-risk activities1.

Implementing transaction monitoring systems that can identify and flag unusual or suspicious patterns of behavior, such as large or frequent transfers, transfers to or from sanctioned entities or countries, or transfers that do not match the customer’s profile or expected activity12.

Applying the travel rule, which requires the originator and beneficiary VASPs (or financial institutions) to exchange and retain information on the parties involved in the transfer, such as their names, account numbers, addresses, and national identification numbers13.

Establishing information-sharing and cooperation mechanisms with other VASPs, financial institutions, and regulators, to facilitate the exchange of relevant data and intelligence on P2P transactions and customers14.

 1: Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers - FATF, page 13-16, 28-29, 32-33, 40-412: AML and Compliance Solution for The P2P Industry - Sanction Scanner3: P2P Money Laundering: How to Comply - ComplyAdvantage4: 2024 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment - U.S. Department of the Treasury, page 17.

Financial institutions must conduct thorough background checks on employees in sensitive roles (e.g., private banking) to mitigate fraud, insider trading, and money laundering risks.

Option A (Correct):Past employment records help verify work history and identify any red flags related to prior financial misconduct.

Option D (Correct):Internet and media searches reveal any negative press, regulatory issues, or connections to illicit activity.

Option E (Correct):Criminal history searches help screen for prior convictions related to financial crimes.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option B (Incorrect):Personal references are less reliable and may not uncover objective risk factors.

Option C (Incorrect):A resume is self-reported and should be verified using independent sources.

Best Practices for Employee Background Screening:

Conduct enhanced due diligence for high-risk roles (e.g., private bankers, compliance officers).

Use reliable background screening tools and legal databases.

Verify employment history and check against regulatory blacklists.

A corporate account opened on behalf of several beneficial owners is a red flag because it may indicate an attempt to conceal the identity or source of funds of the ultimate beneficiaries1. The customer’s stated investment goal of long-term investment is not reflective of the account activity, which involves frequent and large transfers, currency exchanges, and account depletion within a short period of time. This discrepancy may suggest that the customer is using the account for money laundering or other illicit purposes2.

= 1: ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs, Module 3, Lesson 4, Topic: Corporate Accounts 2: ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course - Exam-Labs, Module 3, Lesson 4, Topic: Customer Profile and Account Activity