Pass the Swift Customer Security Programme (CSP) CSP-Assessor Questions and answers with CertsForce

In the SWIFT architecture, VPN boxes (e.g., Alliance Connect boxes or virtual VPN appliances) are network devices that establish a secure connection to the SWIFT Secure IP Network (SIPN) using Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology. Let’s evaluate the statement:

•The "Messaging Interface" refers to components like Alliance Access (SAA), which create, process, and manage SWIFT messages (e.g., MT103). The "Communication Interface" refers to components like Alliance Gateway (SAG), which consolidate message flows and connect to the SWIFT network via SwiftNet Link (SNL).

•The SWIFT VPN boxes are located at the network boundary, connecting the customer’s internal SWIFT environment (including both messaging and communication interfaces) to the external SIPN. They are not positioned between the messaging interface and the communication interface; instead, they sit outside the SWIFT secure zone, linking the entire local infrastructure to SWIFTNet.

•In a typical deployment, the architecture flows as follows: Messaging Interface (e.g., Alliance Access) → Communication Interface (e.g., Alliance Gateway with SNL) → VPN Boxes → SWIFTNet. The VPN boxes are part of the external connectivity layer, not an intermediary between internal components. This is supported by CSCF Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection," which defines the secure zone as including messaging and communication interfaces, with VPN boxes providing the external link.

•The statement’s implication that VPN boxes separate the messaging and communication interfaces is incorrect, as they are part of the broader connectivity infrastructure.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The SWIFT VPN boxes are not located between the Messaging and Communication interface; they connect the entire local SWIFT environment to the SIPN, making the statement false.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024: Control 1.1 defines the secure zone and external connectivity via VPN boxes.

•SWIFT Alliance Gateway Documentation: Describes the placement of VPN boxes outside the communication interface.

•SWIFT Network Architecture Guide: Confirms VPN boxes as the external connection point to SIPN.

The "Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025" and "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" define provider categories and CSP impact. Let’s evaluate each option:

•Option A: The public cloud provider is considered a L2BA provider, and therefore not in scope of the CSP

This is incorrect. An L2BA (Lite2 Business Application) provider hosts the full SWIFT stack for users, but a public cloud provider offering a virtual machine is not an L2BA provider unless it provides the full service. The CSP still applies to the provider’s infrastructure.

•Option B: The public cloud provider is considered a SWIFT connectivity provider, and therefore not in scope of the CSP

This is incorrect. A SWIFT connectivity provider (e.g., Alliance Connect) is a specific role, but a public cloud provider (e.g., AWS) hosting a communication interface is an outsourcing agent, subject to CSP requirements.

•Option C: The public cloud provider is considered an outsourcing agent, and therefore in scope of the CSP

This is correct. The "Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025" classifies public cloud providers hosting SWIFT components (e.g., a virtual machine with Alliance Gateway) as outsourcing agents. The CSP impacts the provider by requiring them to secure the underlying infrastructure (e.g., Control 1.1), while the user secures the communication interface.

•Option D: This type of implementation is not allowed by the CSP

This is incorrect. The CSP permits cloud-based deployments, including user-installed components on public cloud VMs, as long as security controls are met.

Summary of Correct Answer:

The public cloud provider is an outsourcing agent, in scope of the CSP (C).

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Outsourcing Agents - Security Requirements Baseline v2025: Defines cloud providers as outsourcing agents.

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Applies controls to outsourced environments.

•CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025: Includes cloud provider assessments.

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This question addresses valid implementations ofControl 2.9: Transaction Business Controlsunder theSwift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, which focuses on detecting and preventing fraudulent transactions.

Step 1: Understand Control 2.9 Transaction Business Controls

Control 2.9 requires Swift users to implement measures to validate transaction flows against expected business patterns, aiming to detect anomalies that could indicate fraud or error. TheCSCF v2024emphasizes flexibility in implementation, provided the controls mitigate identified risks effectively.

Step 2: Evaluate Each Option

A. Multiple measures must be implemented by the Swift user to validate the flows of transactions are in the bounds of the normal expected businessTheCSCF v2024, underControl 2.9, mandates the use of multiple detection measures (e.g., transaction monitoring, threshold limits, anomaly detection) to ensure transaction flows align with normal business expectations. This multi-layered approach is essential to address diverse fraud risks.Conclusion: This is correct.

B. A customer designed implementation or a combination of different measures are deemed valid if they sufficiently mitigate the control risksTheCSCF v2024allows flexibility in how users implement Control 2.9, permitting custom solutions or combinations of measures (e.g., AI-based monitoring, manual reviews) as long as they effectively mitigate the risks identified in the user’s risk assessment. This is supported by theSwift CSP FAQon control customization.Conclusion: This is correct.

C. Reliance on a recent business assessment or regulator response confirming the effectiveness of the control (as an example CPMI's requirement) is especially poignant to this controlWhile a business assessment or regulator input (e.g., CPMI-IOSCO guidelines) can inform the implementation, Control 2.9 requires the user to implement specific measures, not just rely on external validations. TheCSCF v2024does not allow sole dependence on such assessments; users must demonstrate their own controls.Conclusion: This is incorrect.

D. Any solution is acceptable so long as the CISO approves the implementationTheCSCF v2024requires that implementations meet objective criteria for risk mitigation, not just internal approval by the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The independent assessment must validate effectiveness, not just rely on CISO endorsement.Conclusion: This is incorrect.

Step 3: Conclusion and Verification

The verified answers areAandB, as they align with the requirements and flexibility ofControl 2.9 Transaction Business Controlsin theCSCF v2024, ensuring robust and tailored transaction validation.

References

Swift Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) v2024, Control 2.9: Transaction Business Controls.

Swift CSP FAQ, Section: Control Implementation Flexibility.

Swift Security Best Practices, Section: Transaction Monitoring.

The SWIFT Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) defines the scope of components that must comply with its security controls, particularly those handling SWIFT-related data or connectivity. Let’s analyze the scenario:

•A Treasury Management System (TMS) application is a back-office system used to manage financial operations, such as payments or liquidity management. A customer connector is a custom application or integration layer that connects the user’s systems (e.g., TMS) to the SWIFT infrastructure, in this case via a Service Bureau. The hosting system is the physical or virtual machine on which both applications are installed.

•The TMS and customer connector are on the same machine, and the customer connector connects to a Service Bureau, which hosts the SWIFT communication infrastructure (e.g., Alliance Gateway).

•CSCF Scope: The "Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025" and "CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree" define the scope as including:

oCustomer connectors: These are in scope because they facilitate SWIFT connectivity (e.g., sending/receiving SWIFT messages), even if connecting via a Service Bureau.

oSystems hosting in-scope components: The hosting system (machine) is in scope because it runs the customer connector, which is directly involved in SWIFT data flows.

oBack-office systems (e.g., TMS): Normally, back-office systems are out of scope unless they are closely integrated with SWIFT infrastructure. In this case, the TMS is installed on the same machine as the customer connector, creating a shared environment. The CSCF considers systems in the same environment as in-scope if they could impact the security of SWIFT-related components (e.g., Control "1.1 SWIFT Environment Protection").

•Service Bureau Context: Connecting to a Service Bureau (architecture type A2) does not exempt the local components from CSCF scope. The "Independent Assessment Framework" requires assessing all local components that interact with SWIFT, even if the communication layer is outsourced.

•Option A: The TMS application, the customer connector, and the hosting system are in the scope of the CSCF

This is correct. The customer connector is explicitly in scope as it handles SWIFT data flows. The hosting system is in scope because it runs the connector. The TMS, while typically a back-office system, is in scope because it shares the same machine, creating a risk of lateral movement or privilege escalation (e.g., CSCF Control "1.1"). The "CSP_controls_matrix_and_high_test_plan_2025" includes shared environments in the assessment scope.

•Option B: Only the customer connector application is in scope of the CSCF. The TMS application is a back-office

This is incorrect. While the TMS is a back-office system, its co-location on the same machine as the customer connector brings it into scope due to shared risks, as per CSCF guidelines.

•Option C: The TMS application is the highest risk and must be secured appropriately. The customer connector should be secured on a best effort basis

This is incorrect. The CSCF does not prioritize the TMS as the "highest risk" nor suggest "best effort" security for the customer connector. Both components must be secured per mandatory controls when in scope.

•Option D: The TMS application, the customer connector, and the hosting system are in scope only if they connect directly to SWIFT, not towards a Service Bureau

This is incorrect. The CSCF scope includes components connecting via a Service Bureau, as they still handle SWIFT data and are part of the user’s architecture (e.g., A2).

Summary of Correct Answer:

The TMS application, customer connector, and hosting system are all in scope of the CSCF (A) due to their shared environment and connectivity to SWIFT via a Service Bureau.

References to SWIFT Customer Security Programme Documents:

•Swift Customer Security Controls Framework v2025: Control 1.1 includes shared environments in scope.

•CSP Architecture Type - Decision tree: Classifies A2 for Service Bureau setups with local connectors.

•Independent Assessment Framework: Requires assessing all components in shared environments.

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