Pass the IAPP Certified Information Privacy Professional CIPP-US Questions and answers with CertsForce

 Employers have a duty to protect the personal information of their current and former employees, as well as applicants, from unauthorized access, use, or disclosure. This duty may arise from federal or state laws, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), or the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), or from contractual obligations, such as non-disclosure agreements or privacy policies. Employers may retain sensitive employment records, such as performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, medical records, or background checks, for a legitimate business purpose, such as complying with legal requirements, defending against lawsuits, or conducting audits. However, employers must ensure that these records are stored securely, accessed only by authorized personnel, and disposed of properly when no longer needed. References: IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1, IAPP CIPP/US Body of Knowledge, Domain IV, Objective B

The “Discover” phase of building an information management program is the first step in the process of creating a privacy framework. It involves identifying the types, sources, and flows of personal information within an organization, as well as the legal, regulatory, and contractual obligations that apply to it. The tasks in this phase include:

Conducting a data inventory and mapping exercise to document what personal information is collected, used, shared, and stored by the organization, and how it is protected.

Assessing the current state of privacy compliance and risk by reviewing existing policies, procedures, and practices, and identifying any gaps or weaknesses.

Understanding the laws that regulate a company’s collection of information, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).

Facilitating participation across departments and levels to ensure that all stakeholders are involved and informed of the privacy goals and objectives, and to foster a culture of privacy awareness and accountability.

Developing a process for review and update of privacy policies is not a task in the “Discover” phase, but rather in the “Implement” phase, which is the third step in the process of creating a privacy framework. It involves putting the privacy policies and procedures into action, and ensuring that they are effective and compliant. The tasks in this phase include:

Developing a process for review and update of privacy policies to reflect changes in the business environment, legal requirements, and best practices, and to incorporate feedback from internal and external audits and assessments.

Implementing privacy training and awareness programs to educate employees and other relevant parties on their roles and responsibilities regarding privacy, and to promote a privacy-by-design approach.

Establishing privacy governance and oversight mechanisms to monitor and measure the performance and outcomes of the privacy program, and to ensure accountability and transparency.

Developing a process for responding to privacy incidents and requests from data subjects, regulators, and other parties, and to mitigate and remediate any privacy risks or harms.

References:

IAPP CIPP/US Body of Knowledge, Domain I: Information Management from a U.S. Perspective, Section A: Building a Privacy Program

IAPP CIPP/US Certified Information Privacy Professional Study Guide, Chapter 1: Information Management from a U.S. Perspective, Section 1.1: Building a Privacy Program

Practice Exam - International Association of Privacy Professionals

Contact tracing apps are designed to help public health authorities track and contain the spread of COVID-19 or any other diagnosed virus by notifying users who have been in close contact with an infected person. However, these apps also raise privacy concerns, as they collect and process sensitive personal data, such as health status and location information. Therefore, contact tracing apps should follow the principles of privacy by design and default, which means that they should incorporate privacy measures into their development and operation, and offer the highest level of privacy protection to users.

Some of the privacy measures that should be considered when designing contact tracing apps are:

Data retention: Contact tracing apps should only retain the personal data they collect for as long as necessary to achieve their public health purpose, and delete or anonymize the data afterwards. Data retention periods should be clearly communicated to users and based on scientific evidence and legal requirements.

Use limitations: Contact tracing apps should only use the personal data they collect for the specific and legitimate purpose of contact tracing, and not for any other purposes, such as commercial, law enforcement, or surveillance. Use limitations should be enforced by technical and organizational measures, such as encryption, access controls, and audits.

User confidentiality: Contact tracing apps should protect the confidentiality of users’ personal data and identity, and not disclose them to third parties without their consent or legal authorization. User confidentiality should be ensured by technical and organizational measures, such as pseudonymization, aggregation, and data minimization.

Opt-out choice, on the other hand, is not a privacy measure that should be considered when designing contact tracing apps, as it would undermine their effectiveness and public health objective. Contact tracing apps rely on voluntary participation and widespread adoption by users to function properly and achieve their purpose. Therefore, offering users the option to opt out of the app or certain features, such as data sharing or notifications, would reduce the app’s coverage and accuracy, and potentially expose users and others to greater health risks. Instead of opt-out choice, contact tracing apps should provide users with clear and transparent information about how the app works, what data it collects and how it uses it, what benefits and risks it entails, and what rights and controls users have over their data. This way, users can make an informed and voluntary decision to use the app or not, based on their own preferences and values.

References:

[IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide], Chapter 2: Privacy by Design and Default, pp. 35-36.

[IAPP CIPP/US Body of Knowledge], Section II: Limits on Private-sector Collection and Use of Data, Subsection B: Privacy by Design, pp. 9-10.

[IAPP Glossary], Terms: Contact Tracing, Privacy by Design, Privacy by Default.

According to the web search results from my predefined tool, Florida is the only state among the four options that currently imposes a definite limit for notification to affected individuals in case of a data breach. Florida’s law requires that notice be provided within 30 days after determination of the breach or reason to believe a breach occurred, unless delayed by law enforcement or measures to determine the scope of the breach and restore the integrity of the system1. The other states have more flexible or vague terms for the notification timeframe, such as “as soon as practicable” (Maine), “in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay” (New York), or “in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement” (California)2. References:

Security Breach Notification Chart | Perkins Coie

State Data Breach Notification Chart - International Association of …

The Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, enacted in 2018, updates the legal framework for federal law enforcement to access electronic data held by U.S. service providers, even when the data is stored outside the United States. The act resolves jurisdictional issues that arise in cross-border data requests and facilitates international cooperation for law enforcement purposes.

Key Provisions of the CLOUD Act:

Data Access for Law Enforcement:

The CLOUD Act allows U.S. federal law enforcement to compel U.S.-based service providers (e.g., Microsoft, Google) to provide access to data stored abroad using a valid warrant or subpoena, provided the request complies with applicable laws.

International Data Sharing Agreements:

The CLOUD Act enables the U.S. to establish bilateral agreements with other countries to streamline access to data for law enforcement purposes. These agreements ensure that U.S. and foreign law enforcement can access data without violating each other's sovereignty or privacy laws.

Conflict with Foreign Laws:

The act includes mechanisms for providers to challenge data requests that conflict with the laws of the country where the data is stored, providing safeguards for compliance with foreign privacy laws like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Explanation of Options:

A. Codify a treaty with the EU that permits the cross-border transfer of personal information from the EU to the United States in compliance with the GDPR:This is incorrect. The CLOUD Act is not specific to the EU or GDPR compliance. Instead, it focuses on law enforcement access to data stored abroad.

B. Update the legal mechanisms through which federal law enforcement may obtain data that service providers maintain in a foreign country:This is correct. The CLOUD Act directly addresses law enforcement's ability to compel data access from U.S. providers, regardless of the data's physical location.

C. Establish baseline privacy obligations that U.S. companies must comply with for personal information, even if stored in a foreign country:This is incorrect. The CLOUD Act is focused on law enforcement access to data, not privacy obligations for companies.

D. Prohibit foreign companies from using the personal information of U.S. citizens without their consent:This is incorrect. The CLOUD Act does not regulate foreign companies or impose consent requirements for using personal information.

References from CIPP/US Materials:

CLOUD Act (18 U.S.C. § 2713): Establishes legal mechanisms for cross-border data access and international agreements.

IAPP CIPP/US Certification Textbook: Discusses the CLOUD Act's impact on cross-border data requests and its interaction with global privacy laws.

 The correct answer is D. If the algorithm uses information about protected classes to make automated decisions, Acme must ensure that the algorithm does not have a disparate impact on protected classes in the output. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) protects consumers from unfair, inaccurate, and discriminatory treatment by creditors and other businesses that use credit reports. The FCRA prohibits creditors from using information about protected classes, such as race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or because they receive income from a public assistance program, to make decisions about credit. In the case of Acme Student Loan Company, the algorithm is using information about protected classes to make automated decisions about whether to send payment reminder calls. This could have a disparate impact on protected classes, such as people of color or people with low incomes. For example, people of color may be more likely to be identified as being at risk of default, even if they are just as likely to repay their loans as people of other races. Acme Student Loan Company must ensure that the algorithm does not have a disparate impact on protected classes. This could be done by using a variety of methods, such as:

Testing the algorithm for accuracy, fairness, and bias before and after deployment

Providing consumers with notice and consent options for the use of their data

Allowing consumers to access, correct, or delete their data

Implementing accountability and oversight mechanisms for the algorithm

Ensuring compliance with applicable laws and regulations

References:  https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/how-to/ai-and-privacy-the-privacy-concerns-surrounding-ai-its-potential-impact-on-personal-data/articleshow/99738234.cms

https://pupuweb.com/iapp-cipp-us-qa-privacy-concerns-acme-student-loan-company-artificial-intelligence/

The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights is a set of principles that the Obama administration proposed in 2012 to guide the development of privacy legislation and policies in the United States. The report that introduced the bill of rights stated that it was "generally based on the widely accepted Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)"1, which are a set of standards that originated in the 1970s and have influenced many privacy laws and frameworks around the world. The FIPPs include concepts such as individual control, transparency, security, accountability, and data minimization2. The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights adapted and expanded these principles to address the challenges and opportunities of the digital economy1. References: 1: Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy2, page 92: IAPP CIPP/US Certified Information Privacy Professional Study Guide3, page 17.

 Discrimination is the unfair or prejudicial treatment of people based on certain characteristics, such as race, gender, age, religion, or political affiliation. Discrimination can occur in various contexts, such as employment, education, housing, or public accommodations. Discrimination can violate federal, state, or local laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of protected categories. In the scenario, Evan is susceptible to a lawsuit based on discrimination because he uses social media to favor employees who share his political views and deny promotions to those who do not. This could constitute political discrimination, which is prohibited by some state and local laws, such as the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and the New York City Human Rights Law. Additionally, Evan’s use of social media could reveal other protected characteristics of his employees, such as their race, gender, age, religion, or sexual orientation, and expose him to claims of discrimination based on those grounds as well. For example, if Evan posts derogatory comments about a certain race or religion, and then denies a promotion to an employee of that race or religion, that employee could sue Evan for discrimination under federal laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Civil Rights Act of 1991. References:

Political Discrimination in the Workplace | Nolo

Social Media and Employment Law Summary of Key Cases and Legal Issues

IAPP CIPP/US Certified Information Privacy Professional Study Guide, Chapter 4: State Privacy Laws and Regulations, Section 4.1: State Anti-Discrimination Laws.

The lawsuit, filed in 2014, claimed that Google violated the federal and state wiretap and privacy laws by scanning and indexing the emails of millions of students who used its Apps for Education suite, which included Gmail as a key feature12. The plaintiffs alleged that Google used the information from the scans to build profiles of students that could be used for targeted advertising or other commercial purposes, without their consent or knowledge12. The lawsuit also challenged Google’s argument that the students consented to the scans when they first logged in to their accounts, saying that such consent was not valid under FERPA, which requires written consent for any disclosure of education records12. Google denied the allegations and argued that the scans were necessary for providing security, spam protection, and other functionality to the users12. The case was settled in 2016, with Google agreeing to change some of its practices and policies regarding the scanning of student emails3. References: 1: Lawsuit Alleges That Google Has Crossed A ‘Creepy Line’ With Student Data, Huffington Post, 1. 2: Google faces lawsuit over email scanning and student data, The Guardian, 2. 3: Google data case to be heard in Supreme Court, BBC, 3.

The Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) is a federal regulation that implements the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994. The TSR aims to protect consumers from deceptive or abusive telemarketing practices, such as unwanted calls, false or misleading claims, unauthorized billing, and privacy violations1.

The TSR requires telemarketers and sellers to comply with the National Do Not Call Registry, which is a list of phone numbers of consumers who have indicated that they do not want to receive telemarketing calls2.

The TSR also requires telemarketers and sellers to honor the do-not-call requests of individual consumers, regardless of whether their numbers are on the National Do Not Call Registry or not2.

A do-not-call request is a statement made by a consumer, either orally or in writing, that they do not wish to receive any more calls from a specific telemarketer or seller2.

The TSR requires an entity to share a do-not-call request across its organization when the operational structures of its divisions are not transparent to consumers3. This means that the entity must treat the do-not-call request as if it applies to all of its affiliates and subsidiaries that engage in telemarketing, unless the consumer would reasonably expect them to be separate and distinct entities based on their names, products, or services3.

The TSR does not require an entity to share a do-not-call request across its organization in the following situations:

When the goods and services sold by its divisions are very similar. This is not a relevant factor for determining whether the entity must share a do-not-call request across its organization. The key factor is whether the consumers can distinguish between the different divisions based on their operational structures3.

When a call is not the result of an error or other unforeseen cause. This is not an exception to the requirement to honor a do-not-call request. The TSR prohibits telemarketers and sellers from calling a consumer who has made a do-not-call request, unless the call falls under one of the specific exemptions, such as calls from or on behalf of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, calls to consumers with whom the seller has an established business relationship, or calls to consumers who have given prior express written consent2.

When the entity manages user preferences through multiple platforms. This is not an excuse for not sharing a do-not-call request across its organization. The TSR requires telemarketers and sellers to maintain an internal do-not-call list of consumers who have asked them not to call again, and to update the list at least once every 31 days2. The entity must ensure that the do-not-call request is recorded and communicated across all of its platforms that are used for telemarketing purposes3.

References: 1: Telemarketing Sales Rule 2: Q&A for Telemarketers & Sellers About DNC Provisions in TSR 3: Federal Register :: Telemarketing Sales Rule