In theDesigning and Implementing Enterprise Network Assurance (300-445 ENNA)framework, a common architectural hurdle is monitoring applications protected by Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). ThousandEyes transaction tests utilize automated browser sessions to simulate user behavior, but they face inherent limitations when interacting with "out-of-band" security mechanisms.

Specifically, ThousandEyes agents cannot natively interact with external hardware tokens, biometric prompts, or mobile-app-based OTP generators (Option A). Since an OTP is dynamic and time-sensitive, manually entering it into a static test configuration (Option B) is impossible for an automated, recurring test. While some complex workhooks (Option C) might theoretically interface with a virtual MFA service, this introduces significant security risks and architectural complexity that is generally discouraged in a standard assurance design.

The verified and most practical approach is toexclude the MFA step from the transaction test and focus only on the SAML login(Option D). For monitoring purposes, IT teams often create a "synthetic user" account within the Identity Provider (IdP) that is specifically exempted from MFA policies when originating from known ThousandEyes Enterprise Agent IP addresses. This allows the transaction script to validate the availability and performance of the SAML-based SSO redirect, the credential challenge, and the final application landing page. This strategy ensures that the network and application health can be baselined without the test being blocked by a security gate it was never intended to pass.