To ensure a Lambda function URL is reachable only through CloudFront, the solution must (1) make CloudFront the only authorized caller, and (2) prevent direct public access to the function URL endpoint. The AWS-native way to do this is to use a resource-based policy on the Lambda function that permits invocation only from the specific CloudFront distribution, combined with CloudFront’s Origin Access Control (OAC) to sign origin requests.

A Lambda function URL can be configured for IAM-based authorization, and Lambda supports resource-based permissions (via lambda:AddPermission) that restrict who can invoke it. By scoping the permission so that only the CloudFront distribution (identified by a source ARN / distribution identifier) is allowed, direct requests that do not come through CloudFront will be rejected. This enforces the requirement that the function URL cannot be accessed directly.

CloudFront OAC is the modern mechanism to securely access origins by having CloudFront sign the requests it sends to the origin. When CloudFront signs requests and the origin (here, the Lambda function URL) is configured to accept only authorized requests per its resource policy, CloudFront becomes the only viable access path.

Option A is incorrect because CloudFront does not use a “resource-based policy” to grant access to an origin in this way; the enforcement must happen at the origin. Option C is not how CloudFront accesses origins; CloudFront does not assume a customer IAM role to fetch origin content. Option D is fragile and not recommended: CloudFront IP ranges can change and are not intended to be used as a static allowlist for origin protection; additionally, IP-based controls do not provide the same strong identity-based authorization that OAC + resource policy provides.

Therefore, B is the correct solution: restrict the Lambda function URL with a Lambda resource-based policy and configure CloudFront with OAC so only CloudFront-originated requests are accepted.