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Option C is the best fit because Amazon GuardDuty provides managed threat detection forEKSby analyzingEKS control plane audit logs(EKS Protection) and correlating those signals withruntime telemetry(Runtime Monitoring) that includesprocess/OS activity, network connections, and file activityon the worker nodes. This directly matches the requirement to monitor EKS audit logsin addition tooperating system, networking, and file events to detect Kubernetes security risks.

GuardDuty produces securityfindingsfor suspicious Kubernetes behavior and runtime indicators (for example, unexpected API calls, anomalous container activity, or known malicious behaviors). To notify the security team, anAmazon EventBridgerule can match GuardDuty findings and forward them to anSNS topic. SNS supportsemail subscriptions, so the team’s mailing list can receive near-real-time alerts without building a custom log parsing pipeline.

Option A (Security Hub) aggregates findings and maps to controls/standards but does not itself provide the combined audit-log + runtime event detection described. Option B combines unrelated services and still requires custom processing. Option D only alarms on “new audit logs generated,” which does not detect “security risks” and does not include OS/network/file threat detections.

Before beginning an investigation, incident response best practice is topreserve evidence,prevent accidental loss of the asset, andclearly mark and control the potentially affected resource. Enablingtermination protection(Option B) helps ensure the instance is not accidentally terminated during triage, which would destroy volatile evidence and complicate forensics and recovery.

TakingEBS snapshotsof all attached data volumes (Option C) preserves a point-in-time copy of disk evidence for later forensic analysis, malware scanning, or offline investigation. Snapshots allow responders to create forensic volumes or AMIs in an isolated environment without repeatedly touching the potentially compromised instance.

Capturinginstance metadataand tagging the instance asunder quarantine(Option E) supports both investigation and operational control. Metadata capture (instance ID, IAM role, network interfaces, security groups, user-data, tags, recent changes) provides context for responders. Quarantine tagging enables automated workflows (for example, incident runbooks that isolate the instance, restrict IAM, or move it to a quarantine security group) and signals to other teams/tools that the instance is under investigation.

Option A is the opposite of what you want. Option D destroys evidence. Option F is not an appropriate “before investigation” step; altering metadata risks losing evidence and is not the primary containment approach.

The findingInstanceCredentialExfiltrationindicates that credentials available to the EC2 instance (from the instance profile / IMDS) were likely stolen and then used from an unusual location. The fastest way todeny the malicious actor immediatelyis to invalidate the stolen, currently usable credentials. Because these aretemporary credentialsissued to the instance profile role, the correct first containment action is torevoke active sessionsfor that role so the stolen session credentials stop working. This directly blocks continued API use while you continue investigation and remediation.

Changing security groups (Option A) affects inbound network access to the website but does not stop an attacker from using stolen API credentials against AWS APIs. Installing agents and running assessments (Options B and C) are investigative steps that take time and do not immediately cut off the attacker’s current access. After revoking sessions, best practice incident response typically continues with additional containment and eradication steps such as rotating credentials, reviewing CloudTrail for actions taken, checking for persistence (new IAM users/keys, modified policies), patching the instance, and restricting IMDS (for example, enforcing IMDSv2) to reduce risk of further credential theft.