Pass the PCI SSC PCI Qualified Professionals QSA_New_V4 Questions and answers with CertsForce

 Scope of Anti-Malware Requirements

PCI DSS Requirement 5 mandates the use of anti-malware solutions on all in-scope systems unless the system is specifically documented as not being at risk from malware.

Examples of systems not at risk include those using operating systems that do not support anti-malware tools, provided proper justifications and alternative controls are implemented​​.

 Assessment Considerations

QSAs must verify and document why a system is considered "not at risk."

Systems storing, processing, or transmitting cardholder data or that could impact the CDE are generally in-scope for anti-malware​​.

 Incorrect Options

Option A: While CDE systems and connected systems require protection, the requirement applies specifically to systems at risk from malware.

Option B: Portable electronic storage is not explicitly called out for universal anti-malware but must be controlled in line with overall security policies.

Option C: Systems storing PAN are only a subset of in-scope systems.

ThePCI PIN Transaction Security (PTS)standard applies topoint-of-interaction (POI) hardware devices, such as PIN entry devices and POS terminals. It ensures these devicessecurely capture and process account data, particularly for PIN-based transactions.

Option A:✅Correct. PCI PTS focuses onhardware devicesthat process PIN or card data.

Option B:❌Incorrect. This is covered under theSecure Software Standard(part of the Software Security Framework).

Option C:❌Incorrect. Algorithm development is outside PCI SSC’s scope.

Option D:❌Incorrect. End-to-end encryption is covered in other guidance (e.g., P2PE), not PTS.

PCI DSSRequirement 6.3.1requires entities toassign a risk rankingto vulnerabilities (e.g., high, medium, low) to ensure thatremediation efforts are prioritised. This risk-based approach helps organisations focus resources where they are most needed.

Option A:❌Incorrect. Timeframes depend on the severity and internal policy, not always 30 days.

Option B:❌Incorrect. Risk ranking supports remediation but doesn’t replace scanning.

Option C:✅Correct. The purpose is toprioritise higher-risk itemsfor faster action.

Option D:❌Incorrect. Patch frequency is addressed elsewhere (Requirement 6.3.3).

PCI DSS allows for theuse of truncation and hashingfor protecting PAN, butRequirement 3.4.1and its guidance warn againstcombining hashed and truncated PANsin such a way that the original PAN could be reconstructed. If both formats exist,controls must ensurethey can't be used together to reverse-engineer the PAN.

Option A:✅Correct. Controls must ensure PAN cannot be reconstructed using both versions.

Option B:❌Incorrect. A hashed PAN does not need truncation — hashing is a separate mechanism.

Option C:❌Incorrect. PCI DSS aims to prevent correlation, not encourage it.

Option D:❌Incorrect. They can coexist, but must be secured so that PAN cannot be derived.

There areseparate Attestation of Compliance (AOC) templatesfor different use cases, specifically formerchantsandservice providers, and forSAQsversusROCs. Each template is tailored to match the reporting needs of that assessment type.

Option A:✅Correct. PCI SSC publishes distinct AOC templates depending on whether the entity is a merchant or service provider, and depending on whether they are completing an SAQ or ROC.

Option B:❌Incorrect. The AOC is not signed by PCI SSC. It must be signed by the assessed entity and, where applicable, the QSA or ISA.

Option C:❌Incorrect. ROCs and SAQs use different AOC formats.

Option D:❌Incorrect. Both the entity and the assessor (if applicable)mustsign.

Under theCustomized Approach, assessors are responsible forderiving and documenting the testing proceduresinAppendix E of the Report on Compliance (ROC). The assessor must ensure the controlmeets the requirement objectiveand validate it throughcustom testing.

Option A:❌Incorrect. Ongoing monitoring is the entity’s responsibility, not the assessor’s.

Option B:✅Correct. The assessor must derive anddocument testingin Appendix E.

Option C:❌Incorrect. The entity documents control details; the assessor documents test results.

Option D:❌Incorrect. Theentitymust perform the targeted risk analysis, not the assessor.

Requirement9.9.2of PCI DSS v4.0.1 mandates that entitiesregularly inspect POS devicesto detect signs of tampering or skimming. This includes physical inspections to identify unexpected additions, unauthorized stickers, broken seals, etc.

Option A:Correct. Regular inspection for skimming/tampering is required.

Option B:Incorrect. There is no mandate for manufacturer serial number verification.

Option C:Incorrect. PCI DSS does not require routine replacement of device identifiers or labels.

Option D:Incorrect. Devices may be investigated if compromised, but not necessarily destroyed.

Formulti-tenant service providers,isolation and segmentationare critical. As perRequirement 12.10.3, each customer’s environment must besegregated and protectedsuch that no tenant can access another’s data or systems.

Option A:✅Correct. This is the foundational control —isolation of customer environments.

Option B:❌Incorrect. Exposing system config files is a security risk.

Option C:❌Incorrect. Shared user IDs areexplicitly prohibitedby Requirement 8.2.1.

Option D:❌Incorrect. Customers should only access their own logs.

PerSection 11 and 12of PCI DSS v4.0.1, assessors arerequired to use the official PCI SSC ROC Reporting Template. This ensures uniformity and completeness across all assessments. The same requirement applies to bothmerchants and service providersundergoing afull assessment (ROC).

Option A:✅Correct. PCI SSC mandates use of its official ROC template.

Option B:❌Incorrect. Custom assessor templates arenot permitted.

Option C:❌Incorrect. Assessorsmust notcreate their own templates.

Option D:❌Incorrect. The ROC template is used forbothmerchants and service providers, where applicable.

 Stateful Inspection

PCI DSS Requirement 1.2 specifies the need for stateful inspection to track the state of active connections. This ensures that only valid responses to communication initiated by trusted networks are allowed.

Invalid or unsolicited response traffic is blocked to prevent exploitation of vulnerabilities​​.

 Key Functionality of Stateful Firewalls

Stateful firewalls maintain session information and only allow traffic that matches an existing session or expected response.

 Incorrect Options

Option A: Administrative access restrictions are important but unrelated to stateful responses.

Option C: Baseline configurations are a different security control.

Option D: Logging and correlation are for threat detection, not stateful response.